A State at Odds: Who Gets to Represent the Czech Republic at NATO?

A dispute about one summit — and much more

A constitutional dispute is currently unfolding in the Czech Republic over a seemingly simple question: who should represent the country at the upcoming NATO summit? President Petr Pavel insists that, as head of state, he should attend. The Government, led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, disagrees, arguing that the summit concerns defense policy and state commitments — areas for which the cabinet bears political responsibility. The disagreement has escalated to the point where the President has openly considered taking the matter to the Constitutional Court.

For regular readers of our previous newsletter — where we analyzed the President’s refusal to appoint Filip Turek as minister — this development will not come as a surprise. As we argued there, the dispute over a single ministerial nomination was never just about one name. It exposed a deeper constitutional fault line between the President and the new Government. The current NATO conflict is, in many ways, a direct continuation of that earlier clash.

From ministerial appointment to institutional confrontation

The turning point came in January 2026, when President Pavel refused to appoint Filip Turek despite his nomination by the Prime Minister. In his reasoning, the President explicitly referred to concerns about Turek’s long-term public conduct and its compatibility with constitutional values. Legally, that decision already raised a sensitive question under Article 68(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the President appoints ministers “on the proposal of the Prime Minister”. Whether the President may refuse such a proposal — and under what circumstances — remains one of the most contested issues in Czech constitutional law.

Politically, however, the consequences were immediate. Rather than de-escalating, the Motoristé party chose confrontation. Its leader, Foreign Minister Petr Macinka, made it clear that the dispute would not end with the rejected nomination, framing the situation as a long-term conflict and explicitly signaling that relations with the President would escalate into what he himself called an “extreme case of cohabitation”. Against that background, the NATO summit dispute is no longer an isolated incident. It is widely understood as an extension of that earlier conflict — from the level of ministerial appointments to the broader question of how the Czech Republic is represented abroad.

Where the legal conflict lies

At first glance, the Constitution seems to offer a straightforward answer. Article 63(1)(a) provides that the President “represents the state externally”, while Article 67(1) defines the Government as the “supreme body of executive power”. The difficulty is that these provisions operate in parallel rather than in hierarchy. Article 63(3) further provides that presidential acts in this area are subject to countersignature, meaning that the Government bears political responsibility for them. At the same time, Article 68 confirms that the Government is accountable to Parliament and is the central actor of executive policy. The legal dispute therefore turns on a narrow but difficult question: does the President’s power to represent the state entail a right to participate in events such as the NATO summit, or is the exercise of that power ultimately dependent on Government consent? The Constitution does not provide a clear-cut answer. Instead, it presumes coordination — a presumption that is now failing in practice.

Two legitimate interpretations

This is precisely why both sides can rely on serious constitutional arguments. The President is on firm ground when invoking Article 63. The external representation of the state is an explicit constitutional function, and it is difficult to reduce it to a purely symbolic role. Constitutional practice supports this view: Czech presidents have traditionally attended NATO summits, and the current President has done so as well. The Government, however, is equally justified in pointing to the parliamentary nature of the system. It bears full political responsibility for defense policy, NATO commitments and public spending. It is accountable to Parliament and controls the instruments of executive governance. From that perspective, it is logical to argue that representation must follow responsibility. At the same time, the practical aspect speaks for the Government. It is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that finalizes the attendance list for the NATO summit, and it has already announced that the President is not included in the official delegation. The conflict is therefore not about a clear violation of the Constitution. It is about the boundary between two roles that the Constitution deliberately leaves overlapping.

A system under increasing strain

This is where the broader significance of the dispute becomes evident. Since the introduction of direct presidential elections, the Czech President has gained strong democratic legitimacy without a corresponding expansion of formal powers. This creates an inherent tension. As long as political actors respect unwritten limits and seek compromise, the system functions smoothly. But once those constraints weaken, the system begins to generate conflict. That is precisely what we are now seeing. First, the refusal to appoint a minister tested the limits of Article 68. Now, the NATO dispute tests the outer boundaries of Article 63. These are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader pattern of increasingly confrontational institutional behavior.

Beyond Ankara: a constitutional system under stress

The Czech constitutional system is not breaking down. But it is clearly being challenged more directly — and more aggressively — than in the past. What was once managed through political coordination is now being pushed into open conflict. Disputes that would previously have been resolved behind closed doors are turning into public, and potentially judicial, confrontations. The question raised by the NATO summit is therefore not just who will travel to Ankara. It is whether the Czech constitutional framework — built on a combination of written rules and unwritten conventions — can continue to function in an environment where those conventions are increasingly disregarded. And that, more than the outcome of any single dispute, will shape how resilient the system proves to be in the years ahead.

By JUDr. Marie Zámečníková, Ph.D.

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